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Abstract
Software defined networking (SDN) has been adopted to enforce the secu-
rity of large-scale and complex networks because of its programmable, ab-
stract, centralized intelligent control and global and real-time traffic view.
However, the current SDN-based security enforcement mechanisms require
network managers to fully understand the underlying configurations of net-
work. Facing the increasingly complex and huge SDN networks, we urgently
need a novel security policy management mechanism which can be com-
pletely transparent to any underlying information. That is it can permit
network managers to define upper-level security policies without containing
any underlying information of network, and by means of model transforma-
tion system, these upper-level security policies can be transformed into their
corresponding lower-level policies containing underlying information auto-
matically. Moreover, it should ensure the generated lower-level policies can
hold all of security properties defined in upper-level policies. Based on these
insights, we propose a security policy model transformation and verification
approach for SDN in this paper. We first present the formal definition of
a security policy model (SPM) which can be used to specify the security
policies used in SDN. Then, we propose a model transformation algorithm
based on SDN system model and mapping rules, which can enable network
managers to automatically convert SPM models into corresponding under-
lying network configuration policies, i.e., flow table models (FTM). In order
to verify the generated FTM models can hold the security properties defined
in SPM models, we design a verification algorithm based on model checking.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier May 28, 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
13
20
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
20
Finally, we utilize a comprehensive case to illustrate the feasibility of the
proposed approach.
Keywords: SDN, security policy, model transformation, consistency
validation.
1. Introduction
. Currently software-defined networking (SDN) [1] has been adopted to en-
force the security of large-scale and complex networks because of its pro-
grammable, abstract, centralized intelligent control and global and real-time
traffic view. For instances, Garay et al [2] proposed a SDN-based network
access control mechanism, flownac, which is a centralized EAP (Extensible
Authentication Protocol) based on terminal security authentication method
for IEEE 802.1x wireless local area network (WLAN). Yakasai et al [3] pro-
posed the flowidentity network access control mechanism. This mechanism
integrates EAP security authentication mechanism into SDN controller, and
then uses custom firewall policy to control terminal access. Hu et al [4] pro-
posed a dynamic firewall mechanism based on SDN, flowguard. With this
mechanism, network administrators can flexibly customize different types of
firewall policies and authenticate different types of network devices. Ko-
erner et al [5] proposed a device security authentication mechanism based
on MAC address and SDN. This mechanism uses the floodlight controller to
map the MAC address of the laptop to the corresponding VLAN address in
the network. Because the MAC address is static, it can ensure the security
authentication of the mobile workstation. However, current SDN-based secu-
rity enforcement mechanisms require network managers to fully understand
the detailed underlying configurations of network (such as MAC address, IP
address, VLAN ID, network type and etc.) and then load these security poli-
cies (such as access control policies or firewall policies) containing underlying
information of the network into the SDN controller by means of control pro-
grams or manual input. However, facing the increasingly complex and huge
SDN networks, traditional security policy management is becoming more and
more difficult because it is nearly impossible for network managers to fully
understand all of underlying configurations. Moreover, with the emergence
of multi-controller SDN [6], network managers need to manage a variety of
heterogeneous SDN controllers at the same time. In this case, the same se-
curity policy often needs to be developed and deployed for different types of
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controllers, which inevitably increases the complexity and difficulty of net-
work management. Therefore, in the face of the increasingly complex and
huge SDN networks, we urgently need a novel security policy management
mechanism which can be completely transparent to any underlying informa-
tion of network. That is it can permit network managers to define upper-level
security policies without containing any underlying information of network,
and by means of model transformation system, these upper-level security
policies can be transformed into their corresponding lower-level policies con-
taining underlying information automatically. Moreover, it should ensure
the generated lower-level policies can hold all of security properties defined
in upper-level policies.
. Based on these insights, we propose a security policy model transforma-
tion and verification approach for SDN in this paper. The main idea of the
approach is to specify the current security policies used in SDN, such as ac-
cess control policies or firewall policies, as a unified security policy model
(SPM). SPM is of an upper-level policy model without containing any un-
derlying information of SDN. Then, we establish SDN system model and
use SDN system model to establish the mapping rules between the objects
of SPM and the objects of SDN system models, and then use these map-
ping rules to automatically convert the SPM models into their correspond-
ing lower-level policy models containing underlying information of SDN, i.e.,
flow table model (FTM). To be practically useful, we must prove that the
generated FTM can ensure all of security properties defined in SPM after
model transformation. Thus, we design a verification algorithm based on
model checking. The verification algorithm validates the SDN system model
updated by FTM by means of the security properties defined in SPM, i.e.,
validation conditions. If all of given validation conditions are proofed to
be true after verification, it proves that the generated FTM can hold all of
security properties defined in SPM, otherwise it cannot satisfy the security
requirements. Hence, the main contributions of this paper can be concluded
as follows:
. • We establish the system model of SDN in this paper, which includes
terminal model (TM), OpenFlow switch model (SWM), flow table model
(FTM), network flow model (NFM) and network topology model (NTM).
. • Since most of security policies used in SDN can be described as the
problem whether the policy subject (user, service or terminal, etc.) can
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access or use the policy object (resource, service, data or terminal, etc.), thus
we specify these security policies as a unified security policy model (SPM) in
this paper.
. • Based on the established SDN system model, we further establish the
mapping rules between the objects of SPM and the objects of SDN system
models. Then, based on these mapping rules, we propose a model trans-
formation algorithm which can automatically transform SPM model with-
out containing any underlying information of network into its corresponding
lower-level policy model containing underlying information, i.e., flow table
model (FTM).
. • In order to prove the generated FTM can hold all of security properties
defined in SPM after model transformation, we design a security verification
algorithm based on model checking. The verification algorithm validates the
SDN system model updated by generated FTM by means of the security
properties defined in SPM, i.e., validation conditions. If all of given val-
idation conditions are true, it proves that generated FTM can hold all of
security properties defined in SPM, otherwise it cannot satisfy the security
requirements.
. • Finally, we utilize a comprehensive case to illustrate the feasibility of
the proposed approach. We first establish SDN system model and SPM
of this case, then transform SPM into its corresponding FTM using model
transformation algorithm, and verify the generated FTM can hold all of
security properties defined in SPM after model transformation using model
checking algorithm.
. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discuss some
related works. Section 3 is the main body of this paper, which includes the
framework of approach, SDN system model, security policy model, model
transformation using mapping rules and security policy verification using
model checking. In section 4, we utilize a comprehensive case to illustrate
the feasibility of our approach. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper and
presents some future directions.
2. Related Work
. In this section, we discuss some research works related with policy model
transformation and security policy verification, and compare these works
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with our approach comprehensively.
2.1. Policy Model Transformation
According to the definitions of model driven architecture (MDA), model
transformation refers to the process of transforming the platform indepen-
dent model (PIM) to its corresponding platform specific model (PSM) [7]. In
terms of the literatures we have reviewed, researches on policy model trans-
formation may be roughly divided into three categories, they are template-
based transformation, RBAC-based transformation, as well as system model
& mapping rules-based transformation [8]. Due to the limitations of the tem-
plate, template-based transformation [9] has only very limited policy trans-
formation ability. RBAC-based transformation [10] is generally only suitable
for RBAC (role-based access control) policy transformation, and does not
have ample abilities to describe the underlying system, thus these two kind
of methods are not suitable for SDN.
. System model & mapping rules-based transformation is an active research
issue now. Its main research contents include: (1) system model : defines
the objects of system and the relationship between system objects; (2) policy
model : defines the policy object and the relationship between policy objects;
(3) upper and lower level mapping rules : establish the mapping rules between
the upper-level policy objects and lower-level system objects by means of the
system model [11][12]. Based on the system model & mapping rules, pol-
icy model transformation first establish the underlying system model, then
establish the mapping rules between the upper-level policy objects and the
lower-level system objects based on the system model, and then convert
the upper-level policy model to the lower-level policy model according to
these mapping rules. In particular, Davy et al [13] proposed a policy model
transformation approach based on mapping rules, in which the policy model
is defined as a tuple 〈 event(E), condition(c), behavior(a), subject(s), ob-
ject(T) 〉 and ontology is used to establish the mapping relationship among
the different system layers. Luck et al [14] proposed a method to transform
RBAC model defined in service layer into the policy model used in system
layer. In this method, the system model is divided into three layers: roles &
object (RO), subject & resources (SR) and processes & hosts (PH), and the
mapping rules between the three layers have been constructed. Based on the
Luck’s research, Porto et al. [15] further decomposes the PH layer into two
sub layers, namely DAS (diagram abstract subsystem) layer and PH layer.
5
DAS layer is mainly used to describe the network topology in the original PH
layer, while PH layer is used to describe the specific network information in
DAS layer. In addition, the authors also proposed a policy verification frame-
work, which can be used to verify the consistency problems in the process of
policy transformation. In addition, Lampson et al [16] proposed a network
policy model transformation approach for distributed computing environ-
ment. Maullo et al [17] proposed a policy transformation system based on
the first-order predicate logic, which transforms the high-level policy model
into the low-level network configuration policy through network topology and
other information. Nanxing et al [18] proposed a SDN-oriented access control
policy transformation framework. In this paper, we also propose a security
policy model transformation based on system model & mapping rules. We
first establish the SDN system model, then further establish the mapping
rules between the objects of security policy model and the objects of system
model. Next, we propose a model transformation algorithm based on these
mapping rules.
2.2. Security Policy Verification
. To assure the information system running securely, security mechanisms of
system have to be validated to check if they conform to the security policies.
Traditional test and simulation based methods can only confirm the system
work properly in situations described in the scenarios, but they are difficult
to identify hidden flaws that are not likely to occur probabilistically. While
formal verification methods have been applied to overcome the traditional
methods shortcoming mentioned above. Two common formal methods for
security policy verification are theorem proving and model checking [19].
Theorem proving is unsuitable to validate the complex systems properties
due to its lower efficiency. Model checking [20] can be used to validate the
system whether it conforms to the property expected by modeling the systems
dynamic behaviors and static properties. Model checking has been widely
used in the fields of protocol analysis, hardware design and other situations.
. Security policy is the core of the protection mechanism in information sys-
tems. Many researches on security policy verification have been proposed.
For instances, Al-Shaer et al.[21] proposed a static policy inconsistency detec-
tion method for firewall policies. Bandara et al.[22] proposed a Event calculus
(EC) based framework for security policy verification. They translate policy
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and system behavior specification to a formal notation based on event cal-
culus and then used reasoning techniques for conflict identification. May et
al.[23] verified privacy policies with an asynchronous model checker. Rubio-
Loyola et al.[24] proposed a goal-oriented policy refinement method by means
of a model checking technique with linear temporal Logic (LTL). Graham et
al.[25] proposed an incremental method to validate policy based systems
through direct conflict detection with extended decision table. Baliosan and
Serrat [26] developed a specific finite automaton based approach for policy
conflict detection. In this paper, we also propose a security policy verifica-
tion method using model checking. We first specify the security properties
defined in security policy model as a group of validation conditions, then
input validation conditions and system model into the verification algorithm
for model checking.
3. Security Policy Model Transformation and Verification Approach
. We propose a security policy model transformation and verification ap-
proach for software defined networking in this paper. In the following of this
section, we first present the framework of approach. Then, we establish SDN
system model and present the proposed security policy model (SPM). Next,
based on the established SDN system model, we present how to transform
SPM model into its corresponding FTM model using mapping rules. After
that, we present how to verify the generated FTM can hold all of security
properties defined in SPM by means of model checking algorithm.
3.1. Framework of Approach
. We depict the framework of entire approach as Figure 1, which includes
security policy model (SPM), model transformation system, security verifica-
tion system and SDN system model. Firstly, we specify the security policies
(such as access control policies or firewall policies) used in SDN as a uni-
fied SPM. Then, we establish SDN system model. Based on SDN system
model, we further establish the mapping rules between the objects of SPM
and the objects of SDN system model, and then utilize these mapping rules
to automatically convert SPM model into its corresponding underlying net-
work configuration policies, i.e., flow table model (FTM). To be practically
useful, we must prove that the generated FTM can ensure all of security
properties defined in SPM after model transformation. Thus, we design a
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security verification system based on model checking technique. Before ver-
ification, we first update SDN system model using the generated FTM, and
the updated SDN system model is denoted as RSDN . Then, we specify the
security properties defined in SPM as a group of specific validation conditions
{ V Ci }, then we input RSDN and { V Ci } into security verification system
and execute model checking. If all of given validation conditions { V Ci } are
proofed to be true after verification, it proves that the generated FTM can
hold all of security properties defined in SPM. Otherwise, it cannot satisfy
the security requirements of SPM. In this case, we will redesign our model
transformation system until it can meet all of requirements.
Figure 1: The framework of approach.
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